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The discrete-time mean-variance portfolio selection formulation, a representative of gen-
eral dynamic mean-risk portfolio selection problems, does not satisfy time consistency in
efficiency (TCIE) in general, i.e., a truncated pre-committed efficient policy may become in-
efficient when considering the corresponding truncated problem, thus stimulating investors’
irrational investment behavior. We investigate analytically effects of portfolio constraints on
time consistency of efficiency for convex cone constrained markets. More specifically, we de-
rive the semi-analytical expressions for the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy and
the minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure (VSSM) and reveal their close rela-
tionship. Our analysis shows that the pre-committed discrete-time efficient mean-variance
policy satisfies TCIE if and only if the conditional expectation of VSSM’s density (with re-
spect to the original probability measure) is nonnegative, or once the conditional expectation
becomes negative, it remains at the same negative value until the terminal time. Our findings
indicate that the property of time consistency in efficiency only depends on the basic mar-
ket setting, including portfolio constraints, and this fact motivates us to establish a general
solution framework in constructing TCIE dynamic portfolio selection problem formulations
by introducing suitable portfolio constraints.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a dynamic decision problem, a decision maker may face a dilemma when the overall objective
for the entire time horizon under consideration does not conform with a “local” objective for
a tail part of the time horizon. In the language of dynamic programming, Bellman’s princi-
ple of optimality is not applicable in such situations, as the global and local interests derived
from their respective objectives are not consistent. This phenomenon has been investigated
extensively recently in the literature of finance and financial engineering under the term of time
inconsistency. In the language of portfolio selection, when a problem is not time consistent,
the (global) optimal portfolio policy for the entire investment horizon determined at initial time
may not be optimal for a truncated investment problem at some intermediate time t and for
certain realized wealth level. Investors thus have incentives to deviate from the global optimal
policy and to seek the (local) optimal portfolio policy, instead, for the truncated time horizon.
As time consistency (or dynamic consistency) is a basic requirement for dynamic risk measures
(see Rosazza Gianin (2006), Boda and Filar (2006), Artzner et al. (2007) and Jobert and Rogers
(2008)), all the appropriate dynamic risk measures should necessarily possess certain functional
structure so that Bellman’s principle of optimality is satisfied. Unfortunately, almost all static
risk measures which investors have been comfortably adopting in practice for decades, including
the variance, VaR (Duffie and Pan (1997)) and CVaR (Uryasev (2000)), are not time consistent
when being extended to dynamic situations (Boda and Filar (2006)). Researchers have proposed
using the nonlinear expectation (“g-expectation”) (Peng (1997)) to construct time consistent
dynamic risk measures.
When a dynamic risk measure is time consistent, it not only justifies the mathematical for-
mulation for risk management, but also facilitates the solution process in finding the optimal
decision, as the corresponding dynamic mean-risk portfolio selection problem satisfies Bellman’s
principle of optimality, thus being solvable by dynamic programming (e.g., see Cherny (2010)).
When a dynamic risk measure is time inconsistent, the corresponding dynamic mean-risk port-
folio selection problem is nonseparable in the sense of dynamic programming, thus generating
intractability, or even an insurmountable obstacle in deriving the solution. Consider the dy-
namic mean-variance portfolio selection problem as an example, as it is the focus of this paper.
As the nonseparable structure of the variance term leads to a notoriety of the variance mini-
mization problem, it took almost 50 years to figure out ways to extend the seminal Markowitz
(1952)’s static mean-variance formulation to its dynamic counterpart (see Li and Ng (2000)
for the discrete-time (multi-period) mean-variance formulation and Zhou and Li (2000) for the
continuous-time mean-variance formulation). The derived dynamic optimal investment policy
in Li and Ng (2000) and Zhou and Li (2000) is termed by Basak and Chabakauri (2010) as
pre-committed dynamic optimal investment policy, as the (adaptive) optimal policy is fixed at
time 0 to achieve overall optimality for the entire investment horizon. As the original dynamic
mean-variance formulation is not time consistent, the derived pre-committed dynamic optimal
investment policy does not satisfy the principle of optimality and investors have incentive to
deviate from such a policy during the investment process in certain circumstances, as revealed
in Zhu et al. (2003) and Basak and Chabakauri (2010).
There are two major research directions in the literature to alleviate the effects of the time
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inconsistency of the pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy. To remove the time incon-
sistency of the pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy, Basak and Chabakauri (2010) sug-
gested the so-called time-consistent policy by backward induction in that the investor optimally
chooses the (time consistent) policy at any time t, on the premise that he has already de-
cided his time consistent policies in the future. Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) extended the formulation
in Basak and Chabakauri (2010) by introducing state dependent risk aversion and used the
backward time-inconsistent control method (see Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010)) to derive the cor-
responding time-consistent policy. Czichowsky (2013) considered the time consistent policies
for both discrete-time and continuous-time mean-variance models and revealed the connections
between the two. Enforcing a time consistent policy in an inherent time-inconsistent prob-
lem undoubtedly incurs a cost, i.e., resulting in a worse mean-variance efficient frontier when
compared with the one associated with the pre-committed mean-variance policy, as evidenced
from some numerical experiments reported in Wang and Forsyth (2011). On the other hand,
Cui et al. (2012) relaxed the concept of time consistency in the literature to “time consistency
in efficiency” (TCIE) based on a multi-objective version of the principle of optimality: The
principle of optimality holds if any tail part of an efficient policy is also efficient for any real-
izable state at any intermediate period (Li and Haimes (1987) and Li (1990)). Note that the
essence of the ground breaking work of Markowitz (1952) is to attain an efficiency in portfolio
selection by striking a balance between two conflicting objectives of maximizing the expected
return and minimizing the investment risk. In this sense, TCIE is nothing but requiring effi-
ciency for any truncated mean-variance portfolio selection problem at every time instant during
the investment horizon. Cui et al. (2012) showed that the dynamic mean-variance problem does
not satisfy time consistency in efficiency (TCIE) and developed a TCIE revised mean-variance
policy by relaxing the self-financing restriction to allow withdrawal of money out of the market.
While the revised policy achieves the same mean-variance pair of the terminal wealth as the the
pre-committed dynamic optimal investment policy does, it also enables investors to receive a
free cash flow stream during the investment process. The revised policy proposed in Cui et al.
(2012) thus strictly dominates the pre-committed dynamic optimal investment policy.
It is interesting to note that the current literature on time inconsistency has been mainly con-
fined to investigation of time consistent risk measures. While portfolio constraints serve as an
important part of the market setting, the literature has been lacking of a study on the effects of
portfolio constraints on the property of time consistency and TCIE. Let us consider an extreme
situation where only one admissible investment policy is available over the entire investment
horizon. In such a situation, no matter whether or not the adopted dynamic risk measure is
time consistent, this policy is always optimal and time consistent, as it is the only choice avail-
able to investors. Another lesson we could learn is from Wang and Forsyth (2011) where they
numerically compared the pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy and the time-consistent
mean-variance policy (proposed by Bjo¨rk et al. (2014)) in a continuous-time market with no con-
straint, with no-bankruptcy constraint or with no-shorting constraint, respectively. They found
that with constraints, the efficient frontier generated by the time-consistent mean-variance pol-
icy gets closer to the efficient frontier generated by the pre-committed optimal mean-variance
policy in the constrained market than in the unconstrained market, i.e., the presence of port-
folio constraints may reduce the cost when enforcing a time consistent policy in an inherent
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time-inconsistent problem. Based on the above recognition, it is our purpose to study in this
paper analytically the impact of convex cone-type portfolio constraints on TCIE in a discrete-
time market. Our analysis reveals an “if and only if” relationship between TCIE and the
conditional expectation of the density of the minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure
(with respect to the original probability measure). As our finding indicates that the property
of time consistency in efficiency only depends on the basic market setting, including portfolio
constraints, we further establish a general solution framework in constructing TCIE dynamic
portfolio selection problem formulations by introducing suitable portfolio constraints.
The main theme and the contribution of this paper is to address and answer the following
question: Given a financial market with its return statistics known, what are the cone constraints
on portfolio policies or what additional cone constraints are needed to be introduced such that
the derived optimal portfolio policy is TCIE. The paper is thus organized to present this story
line with the following key points in achieving this overall research goal. For a general class
of discrete-time convex cone constrained markets, we derive analytically the pre-committed
discrete-time efficient mean-variance policy using duality theory and dynamic programming
(Section 2). Theorem 2.1 fully characterizes the distinct features of this policy and, in particular,
reveals that the optimal policy is a two-piece linear function of the current wealth, while the
time-varying breaking point of the two pieces is determined by a deterministic threshold wealth
level. We then discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for the pre-committed efficient
policy to be TCIE (Section 3). Theorem 3.1 specifies the behavior pattern of TCIE policies for
both cases below and above the threshold wealth level. We define and derive the minimum-
variance signed supermartingale measure (VSSM) for cone constrained markets and reveal its
close relationship with TCIE (Section 4). More specifically, we show in Theorem 4.3 that
the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy satisfies TCIE if and only if the conditional
expectation of VSSM’s density (respect to the original probability measure) is nonnegative,
or once the conditional expectation becomes negative, it remains at the same negative value
until the terminal time. We finally answer the question how to completely eliminate time
inconsistency in efficiency by introducing additional cone constraints to the market (Section
5). Theorem 5.1 can be viewed as the culmination of all the results in this paper, in which a
constructive framework in achieving TCIE is established through identifying a convex cone for
constraining portfolios such that its dual cone includes the given expected excess return vector
of the market under consideration. In order to make our presentation clear, we have placed all
the proofs in the appendix.
2 OPTIMAL MEAN-VARIANCE POLICY IN A DISCRETE-TIME CONE
CONSTRAINED MARKET
The capital market of T time periods under consideration consists of n risky assets with random
rates of returns and one riskless asset with a deterministic rate of return. An investor with an
initial wealth x0 joins the market at time 0 and allocates his wealth among these (n+1) assets.
He can reallocate his wealth among the (n + 1) assets at the beginning of each of the following
(T − 1) consecutive time periods. The deterministic rate of return of the riskless asset at time
period t is denoted by st > 0 and the rates of return of the risky assets at time period t are
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denoted by a vector et = [e
1
t , · · · , e
n
t ]
′, where eit is the random return of asset i at time period
t and the notation ′ denotes the transpose operation. It is assumed in this paper that vectors
et, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, are statistically independent with mean vector E[et] = [E[e
1
t ], · · · ,E[e
n
t ]]
′
and positive definite covariance matrix,
Cov (et) =


σt,11 · · · σt,1n
...
. . .
...
σt,1n · · · σt,nn

 ≻ 0.
Assume that all the random vectors, et, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, are defined in a filtrated probability
space (Ω,FT , {Ft}, P ), where Ft = σ (e0, e1, · · · , et−1) and F0 is the trivial σ-algebra over Ω.
Therefore, E[·|F0] is just the unconditional expectation E[·]. Let xt be the wealth of the investor
at the beginning of the t-th time period, and uit, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, be the dollar amount invested
in the ith risky asset at the beginning of the t-th time period. The dollar amount invested in
the riskless asset at the beginning of the t-th time period is then equal to xt −
∑n
i=1 u
i
t. It
is assumed that the admissible investment strategy ut = [u
1
t , u
2
t , · · · , u
n
t ]
′ is an Ft-measurable
Markov control, i.e., ut ∈ Ft, and the realization of ut is restricted to a deterministic and non-
random convex cone At ⊆ R
n. Such cone type constraints are of wide application in practice
to model regulatory restrictions, for example, restriction of no short selling and restriction for
non-tradeable assets. Cone type constraints are also useful to represent portfolio restrictions,
for example, the holding of the first asset must be no less than the second asset, which can
be generally expressed by At = {ut ∈ R
n|Aut ≥ 0, A ∈ R
m×n} (see Cuoco (1997) and Napp
(2003) for more details).
An investor of mean-variance type seeks the best admissible investment strategy, {u∗t } |
T−1
t=0 , such
that the variance of the terminal wealth, Var(xT ), is minimized subject to that the expected
terminal wealth, E[xT ], is fixed at a preselected level d,
(P (d)) :


min Var(xT ) ≡ E
[
(xT − d)
2
]
,
s.t. E[xT ] = d,
xt+1 = stxt +P
′
tut,
ut ∈ At, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
where
Pt =
[
P 1t , P
2
t , . . . , P
n
t
]′
=
[
(e1t − st), (e
2
t − st), . . . , (e
n
t − st)
]′
is the vector of the excess rates of returns. It is easy to see that Pt and ut are independent,
{xt} is an adapted Markovian process and Ft = σ(xt).
Remark 2.1. Varying parameter d in (P (d)) from −∞ to +∞ yields the minimum variance set
in the mean-variance space. Furthermore, as setting d equal to
∏T−1
i=0 six0 in (P (d)) gives rise
to the minimum variance point, the upper branch of the minimum variance set corresponding to
the range of d from
∏T−1
i=0 six0 to +∞ characterizes the efficient frontier in the mean-variance
space which enables investors to recognize the trade-off between the expected return and the risk,
thus helping them specify their preferred expected terminal wealth.
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Note that condition Cov (et) ≻ 0 implies the positive definiteness of the second moment of
(st, e
′
t)
′. The following is then true for t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1:[
s2t stE[P
′
t]
stE[Pt] E[PtP
′
t]
]
=


1 0 · · · 0
−1 1 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
−1 0 · · · 1


[
s2t stE[e
′
t]
stE[et] E[ete
′
t]
]
1 −1 . . . −1
0 1 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 · · · 1

 ≻ 0,
which further implies
E[PtP
′
t] ≻ 0, ∀ t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
s2t (1− E[P
′
t]E
−1[PtP
′
t]E[Pt]) > 0, ∀ t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1.
Constrained dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection problems with various constraints have
been attracting increasing attention in the last decade, e.g., Li et al (2002), Zhu et al. (2004),
Bielecki et al (2005), Sun and Wang (2006), Labbe´ and Heunis (2007) and Czichowsky and Schweizer
(2010). Recently, Czichowsky and Schweizer (2013) further considered cone-constrained continuous-
time mean-variance portfolio selection with price processes being semimartingales.
Remark 2.2. In this section, we will use duality theory and dynamic programming to derive
the discrete-time efficient mean-variance policy analytically in convex cone constrained markets.
We will demonstrate that the optimal mean-variance policy is a two-piece linear function of
the current wealth level, which represents an extension of the result in Cui et al. (2014) for
discrete-time markets under the no-shorting constraint (a special convex cone) and a discrete-
time counterpart of the policy in Czichowsky and Schweizer (2013).
We define the following two deterministic functions, h+t (Kt) and h
−
t (Kt), on R
n for t = 0, 1, . . . , T−
1,
(1) h±t (Kt) = E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt≤±1} + C
−
t+1
(
1∓P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt>±1}
]
,
with terminal condition C+T = C
−
T = 1, and denote their deterministic minimizers and optimal
values, respectively, as
K±t = arg min
Kt∈At
E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt≤±1} + C
−
t+1
(
1∓P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt>±1}
]
,(2)
C±t = E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)2
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)2
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
.(3)
As will be seen later in the paper, functionsK±t and C
±
t appear in the optimal policy for problem
(P (d)). The following lemma is important in deriving our main result in this paper.
Lemma 2.1. For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, the following properties hold,
C±t = E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
,(4)
0 < C±t ≤ C
±
t+1.
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Furthermore, C±t = C
±
t+1 if and only if K
±
t = 0 (Notation 0 denotes the n-dimensional zero
vector).
Note that Lemma 2.1 reduces the piecewise quadratic form of C±t in (3) to a piecewise linear one
in (4). We can adopt Lagrangian duality and dynamic programming to solve problem (P (d)).
Theorem 2.1. Define ρt =
∏T−1
ℓ=t sℓ (with
∏
i∈∅ fi being set to 1). When both d > ρ0x0 and
C+0 = 1 hold, or both d < ρ0x0 and C
−
0 = 1 hold, problem (P (d)) does not have a feasible
solution.
Under the assumption that problem (P (d)) is feasible, its optimal investment policy can be
expressed by the following deterministic piecewise linear function of wealth level xt,
u⋆t (xt) = stK
+
t
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
1{d−µ⋆≥ρtxt} − stK
−
t
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
1{d−µ⋆<ρtxt},(5)
t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
where
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1− (C+0 )
−1
1{d≥ρ0x0} +
d− ρ0x0
1− (C−0 )
−1
1{d<ρ0x0}.(6)
Moreover, the minimum variance set is given as
Var(xT ) =
C+0
(
E[xT ]− ρ0x0
)2
1− C+0
1{E[xT ]≥ρ0x0} +
C−0
(
E[xT ]− ρ0x0
)2
1− C−0
1{E[xT ]<ρ0x0},
and the mean-variance efficient frontier, which is the upper branch of the minimum variance set,
is expressed as
(7) Var(xT ) =
C+0
(
E[xT ]− ρ0x0
)2
1− C+0
, for E[xT ] ≥ ρ0x0.
Note that every point on the lower branch of the minimum variance set corresponding to d < ρ0x0
is dominated by the minimum variance point with E[xT ] = ρ0x0 and Var(xT ) = 0. Although the
cases with d < ρ0x0 do not make sense from an economic point of view for the entire investment
horizon, we do need this explicit expression for the lower branch of the minimum variance set
for our later discussion in the paper. As we demonstrate later in the paper, the pre-committed
investment policy is not time consistent in efficiency. Thus, applying the pre-committed mean-
variance policy for a truncated time horizon could result in an inefficient mean-variance pair
which falls onto the lower branch of the minimum variance set for the truncated time horizon.
Time inconsistency in efficiency hides behind this kind of phenomena which is not economically
sensible. The purpose of this paper is to devise a solution scheme to eliminate time inconsistency
in efficiency, thus removing this kind of phenomena with no economic sense.
Remark 2.3. Theorem 2.1 reveals that the optimal investment policy is a two-piece linear func-
tion with respect to the investor’s current wealth level and this finding represents the discrete-time
counterpart of the result in Czichowsky and Schweizer (2013) for continuous-time. In Section
5, we will also demonstrate that the result in Theorem 2.1 is also an extension of the result in
Cui et al. (2014) for multiperiod mean-variance formulation with no-shorting constraint.
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When d ≥ ρ0x0 and C
+
0 < 1 hold, the optimal investment policy u
⋆
t , t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
in (5) is efficient, which we term as a pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy following
Basak and Chabakauri (2010). When d = ρ0x0, the optimal investment policy is achieved by
u⋆t = 0, i.e., investor invests all his wealth in the riskless asset, which is exactly the minimum
variance policy. When d < ρ0x0 and C
−
0 < 1 hold, the optimal investment policy of (P (d)), u
⋆
t ,
t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, in (5) is inefficient.
Remark 2.4. By setting At = R
n, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, the pre-committed discrete-time efficient
mean-variance policy in (5) reduces to the one in the unconstrained market (Li and Ng (2000)),
u⋆t (xt) = st
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
E
−1
[
PtP
′
t
]
E [Pt] , t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
where
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1−
∏T−1
i=0 (1− E [P
′
i]E
−1 [PiP′i]E [Pi])
−1
.
The major differences between the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policies in a cone con-
strained market and in the unconstrained market lie in the following three aspects. First, in
a cone constrained market, problem (P (d)) may become infeasible, while feasibility is never an
issue for the mean-variance portfolio selection in unconstrained markets. Second, when Pt,
t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, are identically distributed, E−1[PtP
′
t]E[Pt], t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, take the
same value, which implies that investors hold a unique risky portfolio for any time period in an
unconstrained market, which is also independent of the wealth level of the investor. In a cone
constrained market, however, the investor may hold two different risky portfolios, K+t and K
−
t ,
while K+t and K
−
t are in general different for the same time t. A key observation thus is that
the investor may switch his risky position according to his current wealth level. Third, in a cone
constrained market, although the excess rates of return of risky assets, Pt, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
are statistically independent, the future Pτ , τ > t, may influence the current risky portfolios,
K+t and K
−
t , through parameters C
+
t and C
−
t , which implies that the independent structure of
the optimal risky portfolio holding (rooted from the independent assumption of the random rate
of return) is destroyed by the presence of constraints. Thus, in general, K±t 6= K
±
s when t 6= s,
which implies further that the risky positions of the investor are not time-invariant anymore.
In summary, we can conclude that, in a cone-constrained market, the risky positions are both
state-dependent and time-dependent.
3 CONDITIONS FOR TIME CONSISTENCY IN EFFICIENCY OF THE
PRE-COMMITTED EFFICIENT MEAN-VARIANCE POLICY
We check now the performance of the pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy {u⋆t } |
T−1
t=0
derived for the entire investment time horizon given in (5) of the last section in truncated
time periods. More specifically, we would like to examine the efficiency of {u⋆t } |
T−1
t=0 in shorter
time periods and develop conditions under which {u⋆t } |
T−1
t=0 remains efficient all the time. Let
us consider the following truncated mean-variance problem for any realized wealth xk in time
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period k,
(Pk(dk) | xk) :


min Var(xT ) = E
[
(xT − dk)
2
]
s.t. E[xT ] = dk,
xt+1 = stxt +P
′
tut,
ut ∈ At, t = k, k + 1, · · · , T − 1,
xk is known,
where dk is a preselected level of the expected final wealth for the truncated mean-variance
problem. As problem (Pk(dk) | xk) is of the same structure of problem (P (d)), based on
Theorem 2.1, the corresponding optimal policy of (Pk(dk)) is given by
u˜⋆t (xt | dk) = stK
+
t
(
(dk − µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t − xt
)
1{dk−µ⋆k≥ρtxt} − stK
−
t
(
(dk − µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t − xt
)
1{dk−µ⋆k<ρtxt},
t = k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1,(8)
where
µ⋆k =
dk − ρkxk
1− (C+k )
−1
1{dk≥ρkxk} +
dk − ρkxk
1− (C−k )
−1
1{dk<ρkxk}.(9)
Evidenced from our discussion on (P (d)), the solution to (Pk(dk) | xk) is mean-variance efficient
at xk if and only if dk ≥ ρkxk.
Now we consider the following inverse optimization problem of (Pk(dk) | xk): For any xk,
k = 1, 2, . . . , T −1, find an expected final wealth level dk such that the truncated pre-committed
optimal mean-variance policy u⋆t (xt) (t = k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1), with xt = xk, specified in (5)
solves (Pk(dk) | xk). We call such a dk an induced expected final wealth level by the pre-
committed policy at xk. It becomes evident now that if for some xk, k = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, the
induced dk is less than ρkxk, then the truncated pre-committed optimal mean-variance policy
u⋆t (xt) (t = k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1), with xt = xk, is inefficient for the truncated mean-variance
problem from stage k to T with given xk.
Definition 3.1. An efficient solution of (P (d)), {u⋆t (xt)} |
T−1
t=0 , is time consistent in efficiency
(TCIE) if for all wealth xk in time period k, k = 1, . . ., T − 1, the induced expected final wealth
level dk always satisfies dk ≥ ρkxk, such that {u
⋆
t (xt)} |
T−1
t=k solves (Pk(dk) | xk).
In plain language, a globally mean-variance efficient solution is TCIE if it is also locally mean-
variance efficient for every intermediate stage and every possible realizable state (wealth level
xt).
Remark 3.1. Note that the above definition of TCIE shares the same spirit as the one in
Cui et al. (2012). However, the current one is defined in terms of the induced expected final
wealth, while the one in Cui et al. (2012) is defined in terms of the induced trade off between
the variance and the expectation of the terminal wealth.
Remark 3.2. Note also that insisting time consistency of {u⋆t (xt)} |
T−1
t=0 implies that {u
⋆
t (xt)} |
T−1
t=k
solves (Pk(d) | xk) for any realized wealth xk in every time period k, k = 1, . . ., T − 1.
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Remark 3.3. Cui et al. (2012) showed that discrete-time mean-variance portfolio selection prob-
lem is not time consistent in efficiency (TCIE) in unconstrained markets. When the investor’s
wealth level exceeds a deterministic level determined by the market setting, he may become irra-
tional to minimize both the mean and the variance when continuing applying the pre-committed
efficient policy. We will check in this section whether discrete-time mean-variance portfolio
selection problem in cone constrained markets is also not TCIE.
Note that the truncated minimum variance policy is always the minimum variance policy of
the corresponding truncated mean-variance problem. Therefore, we only need to check whether
the truncated pre-committed efficient policy (expect for the minimum variance policy), u⋆t (xt),
t = k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1, is efficient or not with respect to the corresponding truncated mean-
variance problem.
Theorem 3.1. The truncated pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (except for the
minimum variance policy), u⋆t (xt), t = k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1, is also an efficient policy of the
truncated problem (P (dk) | xk), if and only if
(i) d− µ⋆ ≥ ρkxk, or (ii) d− µ
⋆ < ρkxk, C
−
k = 1.
Condition (i) in Theorem 3.1 for the efficiency of the truncated pre-committed efficient mean-
variance policy at time k can be interpreted as a threshold condition for xk,
xk ≤ ρ
−1
k (d− µ
⋆) = ρ−1k
d− C+0 ρ0x0
1− C+0
,
which is similar to the result of Proposition 3.1 in Cui et al. (2012). On the other hand, note
from the last statement in Lemma 2.1, if C−k becomes 1, then all C
−
t with k < t ≤ T − 1 will
remain 1, implying K−t = 0, k ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Therefore, condition (ii) in Theorem 3.1 can be
interpreted as follows: Once the wealth level at time k exceeds the deterministic level, ρ−1k (d−µ
⋆),
investor switches to adopt the minimum variance policy (to invest all his wealth in the riskless
asset). With the help of Eq. (5), under both conditions the investor either holds portfolio K+k
or only invests in riskless asset. Thus, we term K+k as efficient risky portfolio. In contrast, when
d−µ⋆ < ρkxk, C
−
k < 1, the truncated pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy is inefficient
and the corresponding portfolio K−k is thus termed as inefficient risky portfolio.
Based on Proposition 3.1 and the definition of time consistency in efficiency, the following lemma
for TCIE of the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy is apparent.
Lemma 3.1. The pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (except for the minimum vari-
ance policy) is TCIE if and only if condition (i) or condition (ii) holds for all possible xt achieved
by pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy and for all t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1.
Remark 3.4. The following proposition betters our understanding further for investigating the
possibility in achieving TCIE.
Proposition 3.1. Adopting the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy at time t yields
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the following conditional probabilities,
Pr
(
(d− µ⋆) ≥ ρt+1xt+1
∣∣(d− µ⋆) > ρtxt) = Pr (P′tK+t ≤ 1) ,
P r
(
(d− µ⋆) < ρt+1xt+1
∣∣(d− µ⋆) > ρtxt) = Pr (P′tK+t > 1) ,
P r
(
(d− µ⋆) ≥ ρt+1xt+1
∣∣(d− µ⋆) < ρtxt) = Pr (P′tK−t ≤ −1) ,
P r
(
(d− µ⋆) < ρt+1xt+1
∣∣(d− µ⋆) < ρtxt) = Pr (P′tK−t > −1) ,
P r
(
(d− µ⋆) = ρt+1xt+1
∣∣(d− µ⋆) = ρtxt) = 1.
We can conclude now that, for any pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (except for the
minimum variance policy), the probability that condition (i) or condition (ii) holds at time t
only depends on market parameters Pi and K
±
i , i = 0, 1, · · · , t − 1, where we assume the pre-
committed mean-variance policy is efficient with (d− µ⋆) > ρ0x0 (equivalent form of d > ρ0x0).
This finding motivates us to deepen our analysis by linking the time consistency in efficiency
with a minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure introduced in the next section.
4 THE VARIANCE-OPTIMAL SIGNED SUPERMARTINGALE MEASURE
It has been well known that the problems of mean-variance portfolio selection and mean-variance
hedging have a strong connection (see Schweizer (2010)). Xia and Yan (2006) showed that in
an unconstrained incomplete market, the optimal terminal wealth of an efficient dynamic mean-
variance policy is related to the so-called variance-optimal signed martingale measure (VSMM)
of the market, and the optimal terminal wealth has a nonnegative marginal utility if and only
if VSMM is nonnegative. Note that VSMM is the particular signed measure with the minimum
variance among all signed martingale measures, under which the discounted wealth process of
any admissible policy is a martingale. In discrete-time unconstrained markets, the density of
VSMM with respect to the objective probability measure takes a product form (see Schweizer
(1996) and Cˇerny´ and Kallsen (2009)). Actually, VSMM plays a central role in the mean-
variance hedging and is the pricing kernel of the contingent claims (see Schweizer (1995) and
Schweizer (1996)).
Motivated by Xia and Yan (2006), we will carry out our analysis forward in this section by
deriving a similar “VSMM” in our constrained market. However, the situation is much more
complicated in a constrained market than in an unconstrained one. Pham and Touzi (1999)
and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004) showed that in a constrained market, no arbitrage opportunity
is equivalent to the existence of a supermartingale measure, under which the discounted wealth
process of any admissible policy is a supermartingale (see Carassus et al. (2001) for a situation
with upper bounds on proportion positions). Therefore, we define in this paper the partic-
ular measure with the minimum variance among all signed supermartingale measures as the
minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure (VSSM) and derive its semi-analytical form
for discrete-time cone constrained markets. VSSM in our paper can be considered as an exten-
sion of VSMM in constrained markets and both take the product form. We will also show in this
section that the VSSM is not only related to the optimal terminal wealth achieved by efficient
mean-variance policies, but also associated with TCIE of efficient mean-variance policies. Our
results explicitly assess the effect of portfolio constraints on TCIE.
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We use L2(Ft+1, P ) to denote the set of all Ft+1-measurable square integrable random vari-
ables. According to Pham and Touzi (1999) and Chapter 9 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004), a
cone constrained market does not have any arbitrage opportunity if and only if there exists
an equivalent probability measure under which the discounted wealth process of any admissible
policy is supermartingale. Therefore, we extend the definitions of the signed martingale measure
and the variance-optimal signed martingale measure proposed in Schweizer (1996) to a signed
supermartingale measure and minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure in this study.
Definition 4.1. A signed measure Q on (Ω,FT ) is called a signed supermartingale measure if
Q[Ω] = 1, Q≪ P with dQ/dP ∈ L2(FT , P ) and the discounted wealth process of any admissible
policy is supermartingale under Q, i.e., for t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
E
[
dQ
dP
ρ−1t xT (u0,u1, . . . ,uT−1)
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ xt(u0,u1, . . . ,ut−1), ∀ ui ∈ Ai,(10)
where xt(u0,u1, . . . ,ut−1) denotes the time-t wealth level achieved by applying policy {u0,u1, . . . ,ut−1}.
We denote by Ps the set of all signed supermartingale measures. It is easy to see that inequal-
ity(10) is equivalent to either one of the following two inequalities,
E
[
dQ
dP
P′tut
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ 0, ∀ ut ∈ At,(11)
E
[
dQ
dP
Pt
∣∣∣Ft
]
∈ A⊥t ,(12)
where A⊥t denotes the polar cone of At, i.e.,
A⊥t = {y ∈ R
n | y′x ≤ 0, x ∈ At}.
Definition 4.2. A signed supermartingale measure P˜ is called minimum-variance signed super-
martingale measure if P˜ minimizes
Var
[
dQ
dP
]
= E
[(
dQ
dP
− 1
)2]
= E
[(
dQ
dP
)2]
− 1,
over all Q ∈ Ps.
For i = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, we define
mi = E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Fi
]/
E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Fi−1
]
.
Then we have
dP˜
dP
= m1m2 · · ·mT .
Ifmi(ω) = 0, we can setmj(ω), j > i, equal to any value. It is easy to check that E[mi|Fi−1] = 1.
12
In the following, we will derive a semi-analytical form of the minimum-variance signed super-
martingale measure in the cone constrained market. We first formulate the following pair of
optimization problems for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
(A+(t)) : min E
[(
1
C+t+1
1{mt+1≥0} +
1
C−t+1
1{mt+1<0}
)
m2t+1
∣∣∣Ft
]
s.t. E [mt+1|Ft] = 1,
E
[
mt+1Pt
∣∣∣Ft] ∈ A⊥t ,
mt+1 ∈ L
2(Ft+1, P ),
and
(A−(t)) : min E
[(
1
C+t+1
1{mt+1≤0} +
1
C−t+1
1{mt+1>0}
)
m2t+1
∣∣Ft
]
s.t. E [mt+1|Ft] = 1,
−E
[
mt+1Pt
∣∣Ft] ∈ A⊥t ,
mt+1 ∈ L
2(Ft+1, P ).
Lemma 4.1. The solutions of (A+(t)) and (A−(t)) are given respectively by
m+t+1 =
1
C+t
[
C+t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{m+t+1≥0}
+ C−t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{m+t+1<0}
]
,
m−t+1 =
1
C−t
[
C+t+1(1 +P
′
tK
−
t )1{m−t+1≤0}
+ C−t+1(1 +P
′
tK
−
t )1{m−t+1>0}
]
,
and the optimal objective values of (A+(t)) and (A−(t)) are 1
C+t
and 1
C−t
respectively.
Theorem 4.1. The density of the minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure P˜ (with
respect to objective probability measure P ) is given by
dP˜
dP
= (C+0 )
−1
T−1∏
i=0
Bi,
where
B0 = 1−P
′
0K
+
0 ,
Bi = (1−P
′
iK
+
i )1{
∏i−1
j=0Bj≥0}
+ (1 +P′iK
−
i )1{
∏i−1
j=0Bj<0}
, i = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1.
Furthermore,
E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Ft
]
= (C+0 )
−1
t−1∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+t 1{
∏t−1
j=0Bj≥0}
+ C−t 1{
∏t−1
j=0 Bj<0}
)
,(13)
E


(
dP˜
dP
)2 = 1
C+0
.(14)
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There is a strong connection between VSSM and the optimal terminal wealth achieved by the
pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy. Substituting the pre-committed efficient mean-
variance policy in (5) into the wealth dynamic equation yields
(15) x⋆t+1 =
{
stx
⋆
t + stP
′
tK
+
t
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − x
⋆
t
)
, if d− µ⋆ ≥ ρtx
⋆
t ,
stx
⋆
t − stP
′
tK
−
t
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − x
⋆
t
)
, if d− µ⋆ < ρtx
⋆
t ,
with x⋆0 = x0. Set y
⋆
t , x
⋆
t − (d − µ
⋆)ρ−1t . From the wealth equation in (15) which x
⋆
t satisfies,
we deduce
(16)
{
y⋆t+1 = sty
⋆
t − stP
′
tK
+
t y
⋆
t 1{y⋆t≤0} + stP
′
tK
−
t y
⋆
t 1{y⋆t>0},
y⋆0 = x0 − (d− µ
⋆)ρ−10 .
Note that y⋆0 = x0− (d−µ
⋆)ρ−10 =
dρ−10 −x0
C+0 −1
≤ 0 by virtue of the fact that d ≥ x0ρ0 and C
+
0 < 1.
We can show
y⋆t = y
⋆
0
t−1∏
i=0
si
t−1∏
i=0
Bi, t = 1, 2, · · · , T.
For t = 1, it is trivial. Assume that the statement holds true for t, we now show that the
statement also holds true for t+ 1, as
y⋆t+1 = sty
⋆
t − stP
′
tK
+
t y
⋆
t 1{y⋆t≤0} + stP
′
tK
−
t y
⋆
t 1{y⋆t>0}
= y⋆0
t∏
i=0
si
t−1∏
i=0
Bi
[
(1−P′tK
+
t )1{
∏t−1
j=0Bj≥0}
+ (1 +P′tK
−
t )1{
∏t−1
j=0 Bj<0}
]
.
Thus, the time t optimal wealth achieved by the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy
is given by
(17) x⋆t = (d− µ
⋆)ρ−1t − [(d − µ
⋆)− x0ρ0]ρ
−1
t
t−1∏
i=0
Bi,
which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal terminal wealth achieved by the pre-committed efficient mean-
variance policy x⋆T and the VSSM P˜ have the following duality relationship:
x⋆T = (d− µ
⋆)−
(d− µ⋆)− x0ρ0
E
[(
dP˜
dP
)2] · dP˜dP .
Remark 4.1. Xia and Yan (2006) considered the mean-variance portfolio selection problem in
an incomplete, albeit unconstrained, market and established the relationship between the mean-
variance efficient portfolio and the variance-optimal signed martingale measure (VSMM) via
analyzing the geometric property of the problem. Actually, the above Theorem 4.2 is an extension
of Theorem 3.1 in Xia and Yan (2006) for the discrete-time cone constrained market. When
the convex cone constraint is chosen as the whole space, our theorem reduces to the result in
Xia and Yan (2006). On the other hand, different from Xia and Yan (2006), we prove the
theorem by solving both the optimal terminal wealth and the VSSM directly.
14
Most prominently, we will demonstrate in the following that the VSSM is also related to the
property of TCIE of the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy.
Theorem 4.3. The pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (except for the minimum
variance policy) in a cone constrained market is TCIE if and only if the variance-optimal signed
supermartingale measure of this market satisfies:
E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Ft
]
(ω) ≥ 0, ∀ 0 < t < T, ∀ ω ∈ Ω;(18)
or
E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Fk
]
(ω) = E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Fτ
]
(ω) < 0, ∀ τ ≤ k ≤ T, ∀ ω ∈ Ω,(19)
where the stopping time τ is defined as
τ = inf
{
t
∣∣∣ E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Ft
]
< 0, t = 1, 2, · · · , T
}
.
We can conclude from Theorem 4.3 that the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (ex-
cept for the minimum variance policy) satisfies TCIE if and only if the conditional expectation
of VSSM’s density (respect to the original probability measure) is nonnegative, or once the
conditional expectation takes a negative value, it remains the same value until the terminal
time.
It is also easy to see that condition (18) implies that ∀ ω ∈ Ω, (1−P′t(ω)K
+
t ) ≥ 0 and
u⋆t = stK
+
t
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
.
In such a case, every mean-variance investor holds a long position of the effcieint risky portfolio
K+t , whose excess rate of return does not exceed 100% (P
′
tK
+
t ≤ 1), and achieves efficiency
during the entire investment horizon.
The stopping time τ can be also expressed as
τ = inf
{
t
∣∣ (1−P′t−1K+t−1) < 0, t = 1, 2, · · · , T} .
Then, condition (19) implies that for t < τ ,
u⋆t = stK
+
t
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
,
and for k ≥ τ ,
K−k = 0, u
⋆
k = skK
−
k
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1k − xk
)
= 0.
In this situation, every mean-variance investor starts from holding a long position of the efficient
risky portfolioK+t and switches all his wealth into the riskless asset once the excess rate of return
of K+t exceeds 100%, i.e., P
′
tK
+
t > 1.
Theorem 4.3 shows that whether the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (except for the
minimum variance policy) is TCIE only depends on the basic market setting (the distribution
of excess rate of return Pt and the portfolio constraint set At) and does not depend on the
initial wealth level, x0, and the objective level which the investor aspires to achieve, d. This
clear recognition motivates us to consider active introduction of additional market constraints
such that the phenomenon of time inconsistency in efficiency can be eliminated.
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5 ELIMINATION OF TIME INCONSISTENCY IN EFFICIENCY WITH
PORTFOLIO CONSTRAINTS
From our discussion in the previous sections, it becomes clear that constraints on portfolio do
have effects on TCIE. Suppose that a given discrete-time mean-variance problem is originally
not TCIE. Are we able to eliminate the time inconsistency in efficiency by introducing suitable
portfolio constraints into the market? We will demonstrate a positive answer to this question
in this section.
Remark 5.1. We proceed our investigation starting from an unconstrained market, then a
market with no shorting, before dealing with a general cone constrained market.
i) Case of unconstrained markets:
If the market is constraint free, i.e., At = R
n, we have
K±t = ±E
−1
[
PtP
′
t
]
E [Pt] ,
C±t =
T−1∏
i=t
(1− E
[
P′i
]
E
−1
[
PiP
′
i
]
E [Pi]).
Therefore, the optimal mean-variance policy of (P (d)) is
u⋆t = st
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
E
−1
[
PtP
′
t
]
E [Pt] , t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
where
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1−
∏T−1
i=0 (1− E [P
′
i]E
−1 [PiP′i]E [Pi])
−1
,(20)
which is exactly the result in Li and Ng (2000). We can assume here that E−1 [PtP
′
t]E [Pt] 6= 0.
Otherwise, all efficient policies reduce to the one corresponding to investing only in the riskless
asset.
Furthermore, the minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure in the unconstrained mar-
ket is given by
dP˜
dP
=
T−1∏
i=0
1−P′iE
−1 [PiP
′
i]E [Pi]
1− E [P′i]E
−1 [PiP′i]E [Pi]
,
which is exactly the variance-optimal signed martingale measure (VSMM) obtained in Schweizer
(1995), Schweizer (1996) and Cˇerny´ and Kallsen (2009).
Theorem 4.3 shows that the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy (except for the mini-
mum variance policy) in the unconstrained market satisfies time consistency in efficiency if and
only if VSMM is a nonnegative measure for any Ft, i.e.,
P′iE
−1
[
PiP
′
i
]
E [Pi] ≤ 1, a.s.(21)
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Actually, Cui et al. (2012) proved that condition (21) does not hold only if the market is an
incomplete market and proposed a TCIE revised policy which i) achieves the same mean-variance
pair as the pre-committed efficient policy does and ii) receives an additional positive free cash
flow during the investment horizon.
ii) Case of markets without shorting:
Assume that shorting of risky assets is not allowed in the market, i.e., At = R
n
+, and the expected
excess rate of return of risky assets is nonnegative, i.e., E[Pt] ≥ 0. In this situation, we have
K+t = arg min
Kt∈Rn+
E
[
C+t+1
(
1−P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt≤1} + C
−
t+1
(
1−P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt>1}
]
,
K−t = arg min
Kt∈Rn+
E
[
C+t+1
(
1 +P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt≤−1} + C
−
t+1
(
1 +P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt>−1}
]
= 0.
In addition, we also have(
▽Kth
−
t (0)
)′
(Kt − 0) = 2C
−
t+1E[P
′
t]Kt ≥ 0, ∀ Kt ∈ R
n
+.
Therefore, the optimal policy of (P (d)) is
u⋆t = st
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
K+t 1{d−µ⋆≥ρtxt}, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,(22)
where
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1− (C+0 )
−1
,
which is the result derived in Cui et al. (2014).
Furthermore, the variance-optimal signed supermartingale measure in such a market setting is
given by
dP˜
dP
= (C+0 )
−1
(T−1)∧(τ−1)∏
i=0
(1−P′iK
+
i ),
where
τ = inf
{
t
∣∣ (1−P′t−1K+t−1) < 0, t = 1, 2, · · · , T} .
We can see that C−t = 1, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1. Therefore, according to Theorem 4.3, all pre-
committed efficient policies are TCIE in a market with no shorting and with nonnegative expected
excess rate of return.
We proceed now to a discussion for a general cone-constrained market setting.
Theorem 5.1. If a convex cone At is chosen to restrict portfolios such that the expected excess
rate of return vector E[Pt] lies in the dual cone of At, i.e.,
E[Pt] ∈ A
∗
t ,
where A∗t = {y ∈ R
n | y′x ≥ 0, x ∈ At} = −A
⊥
t , then the corresponding optimal discrete-time
pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy is TCIE.
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Figure 5 illustrates the above proposition graphically. Basically, this is an inverse process to
find the convex cone At. For a given market, E[Pt] is known. We first identify a cone A
∗
t such
that E[Pt] ∈ A
∗
t . We then find another cone At such that the selected A
∗
t becomes its dual
cone. Apparently, the condition in Theorem 5.1 aims to enforce the inefficient risky portfolio
K−t equal to zero in order to achieve condition (19). Note that condition (18) is much harder
to satisfy, as it is related to the distribution of excess rate of return which is uncontrollable in
general.
Figure 1: Construction of Suitable Cone Constraint
Example 5.1. We now consider an example of constructing a three-year pension fund consisting
of S&P 500 (SP), the index of Emerging Market (EM), Small Stock (MS) of U.S market and
a bank account. The annual rates of return of these three indices have the expected values,
variances and correlations given in Table 1, based on the data provided in Elton et al. (2007).
SP EM MS
Expected Return 14% 16% 17%
Variance 18.5% 30% 24%
Correlation
SP 1 0.64 0.79
EM 1 0.75
MS 1
Table 1: Data for Example 5.1
We further assume that all annual rates of return are statistically independent and follow i)
the identical multivariate normal distribution (with the statistics described above) or ii) the
identical multivariate t distribution with freedom 5 (and with the statistics described above) for
all 3 years, and the annual risk free rate is 5%, i.e., st = 1.05, t = 0, 1, 2. We first compute
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E[Pt], Cov(Pt) and E[PtP
′
t] as follows, for t = 0, 1, 2,
E[Pt] =

0.090.11
0.12

 , Cov(Pt) =

0.0342 0.0355 0.03510.0355 0.0900 0.0540
0.0351 0.0540 0.0576

 , E[PtP′t] =

0.0423 0.0454 0.04590.0454 0.1021 0.0672
0.0459 0.0672 0.0720

 .
(23)
In order to examine the phenomenon of time inconsistency in efficiency (by observing the number
that the wealth level exceeds the threshold (d− µ⋆)ρ−1t ), we simulate 2× 10
6 samples paths for
each distribution assumption, with the setting of initial wealth equal to x0 = 1 and the target
expected return equal to d = 1.35.
Case 1: When the market is unconstrained, the optimal mean-variance policy of (P (d)) is
u⋆t = st
(
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t − xt
)
E
−1
[
PtP
′
t
]
E [Pt] = 1.05
(
(1.35 + 0.1808)1.05t−3 − xt
)  1.0580−0.1207
1.1052

 ,
t = 0, 1, 2,
with µ⋆ = −0.1808 (based on (20)) for both distribution assumptions. Apparently, under both
the unbounded multivariate normal distribution and multivariate t distribution, equation (21)
does not hold, which implies that the time inconsistency in efficiency may occur. More specif-
ically, recalling Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.1 and noticing C+t = C
−
t < 1 with t < T , the
pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy does not satisfy TCIE if and only if the optimal
wealth level x⋆t exceeds the threshold
(d− µ⋆)ρ−1t = (1.35 + 0.1808) ∗ 1.05
t−3.
The simulation results show that the probabilities that x⋆t exceeds the threshold (d − µ
⋆)ρ−1t
are 0.055 for the multivariate normal distribution and 0.0558 for the multivariate t distribution.
This simulation outcome indicates that a distribution with a heavier tail tends to demonstrate
a higher degree of time inconsistency in efficiency in an unconstrained market.
Case 2: To eliminate the time inconsistency in efficiency, we consider first to add the following
cone constraint to the market,
At = {ut ∈ R
n | E[P′t]ut ≥ 0},
which is a half-space with boundary E[P′t]ut = 0 that is a hyperplane orthogonal to E[Pt]. The
dual cone of At is
A∗t = {y ∈ R
n | y = λE[Pt], λ ≥ 0},
which is exactly the ray along E[Pt] (see Proposition 3.2.1 of Bertsekas (2003)). Notice that the
constraint cone, At, defined above is the largest cone (thus the loosest constraint) which we can
identify to eliminate the time inconsistency in efficiency in this example.
Based on the proof of Theorem 5.1, we have K−0 = K
−
1 = K
−
2 = 0 for both distribution
assumptions. By Lemma 2.1, we can compute K+t numerically through penalty function method
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(see Appendix A of Cui et al. (2014)) with initial point [1.06,−0.12, 1.11]′ as
i) K+0 =

 1.0589−0.1212
1.1086

 , K+1 =

 1.0600−0.1200
1.1100

 , K+2 =

 1.0600−0.1200
1.1100


for the multivariate normal distribution and
ii) K+0 =

 1.0461−0.1335
1.0929

 , K+1 =

 1.0548−0.1263
1.1034

 , K+2 =

 1.0600−0.1200
1.1100


for the multivariate t distribution. The optimal investment policy is thus
i) u⋆t (xt) = 1.05
(
(1.35 + 0.1810)1.05t−3 − xt
)
K+t 1{xt<1.05(t−3)(1.5310)}
for the multivariate normal distribution and
ii) u⋆t (xt) = 1.05
(
(1.35 + 0.1831)1.05t−3 − xt
)
K+t 1{xt<1.05(t−3)(1.5331)}
for the multivariate t distribution. The simulation shows that the probabilities that x⋆t exceeds
the threshold (d − µ⋆)ρ−1t are 0.0559 for the multivariate t distribution and 0.0533 for the
multivariate t distribution. Once x⋆t exceeds the threshold (d − µ
⋆)ρ−1t , the investor puts all
his wealth into the riskless asset, which eliminates the time inconsistency in efficiency in this
example.
Case 3: In this case, we introduce into the market a more realistic convex cone constraint,
At = {ut ∈ R
n | u2t ≥ 0, u
3
t ≥ 0, u
1
t + u
2
t + u
3
t ≥ 0},
which implies that short selling is not allowed for the index of Emerging Market and the Small
Stock of U.S market, and the negative position on S&P 500 cannot be too large. The dual cone
of At in this case is
A∗t =

y ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣ y =

1 0 01 1 0
1 0 1

λ, λ ≥ 0

 .
Note that specifying λ at [0.09, 0.02, 0.03]′ ∈ A∗t yields the ray along E[Pt].
Based on the proof in Theorem 5.1, we have K−0 = K
−
1 = K
−
2 = 0 for both distribution
assumptions. By Lemma 2.1, we can compute K+t numerically through penalty function method
(see Appendix A of Cui et al. (2014)) with initial point [1.06, 0.05, 1.11]′ as
i) K+0 =

1.00760.0044
1.0324

 , K+1 =

1.01330.0037
1.0373

 , K+2 =

1.01470.0031
1.0401


for the multivariate normal distribution and
ii) K+0 =

1.01120.0030
1.0413

 , K+1 =

1.02010.0026
1.0522

 , K+2 =

1.02160.0039
1.0501


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for the multivariate t distribution. The optimal investment policy is thus
i) u⋆t (xt) = 1.05
(
(1.35 + 0.1818)1.05t−3 − xt
)
K+t 1{xt<1.05(t−3)(1.5318)}
for the multivariate normal distribution and
ii) u⋆t (xt) = 1.05
(
(1.35 + 0.1843)1.05t−3 − xt
)
K+t 1{xt<1.05(t−3)(1.5343)}
for the multivariate t distribution. The simulation shows that the probabilities that x⋆t exceeds
the threshold (d − µ⋆)ρ−1t are 0.0569 for the multivariate normal distribution and 0.0588 for
the multivariate t distribution and. Although, compared to the unconstrained case, both the
probabilities increase, the investor puts all his wealth into the riskless asset immediately after
x⋆t exceeds the threshold (d− µ
⋆)ρ−1t .
For the unconstrained market in Case 1, the expression of the efficient frontier achieved by the
pre-committed policy is given in (76) in Li and Ng (2000). For cone constrained markets in
Case 2 and Case 3, their efficient frontiers achieved by the pre-committed policy are given in
Theorem 2.1 of this paper. For problem (P (d)), we also derive in Appendix A9 of this paper
its efficient frontier achieved by the time consistent policy proposed by Basak and Chabakauri
(2010) and Bjo¨rk et al. (2014), with its expression given in (38).
Figure 2 depicts the efficient frontiers in the mean-standard deviation space for Case 1, Case 2
and Case 3 and demonstrates a clear domination relationship among the three. Furthermore,
Figure 3 illustrates a clear dominance relationship between Case 3 and the efficient frontier
achieved by the time consistent policy. As both TCIE policies and the time consistent policy
aim to align the inherently inconsistent global and local interests, they all sacrifice certain degrees
of global performance, thus all being dominated by the pre-committed policy. Case 2 dominates
Case 3 as Case 2 is associated with a looser constraint, while Case 3 is associated with a tighter
constraint. It is interesting to note that both TCIE policies dominate the time consistent policy
significantly, which indicates that insisting time consistency for an inherently time inconsistent
problem may suffer a significant loss in its global performance. Expression (38) reveals that
the time consistent policy achieves a good efficient frontier globally only if Bt is large. In
conclusion, by introducing appropriate constraints into the model, we can not only eliminate
time inconsistency in efficiency, but also strick a good balance between the global and local
mean-variance efficiency. Actually, relaxing the time consistency requirement to TCIE offers us
a flexibility in deciding which level of a good global performance to maintain by introducing
suitable portfolio constraints and deriving the corresponding pre-committed TCIE policy.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have developed in this paper a complete answer to the following question: Given a financial
market with its return statistics known, what are the cone constraints on portfolio policies or
what additional cone constraints are needed to be introduced such that the derived optimal
portfolio policy is time consistent in efficiency. There are three main contributions of the pa-
per: i) analytical solution of the mean-variance formulation for discrete-time cone constrained
markets; ii) complete characterization of time consistency in efficiency and its close relationship
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Figure 2: Comparison of efficient frontiers for Cases 1, 2 and 3 of Example 5.1
to the minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure; and iii) a systematic framework in
guaranteeing time consistency in efficiency by enforcing suitable cone constraints on portfolios.
More specifically, we have investigated in this paper the discrete-time mean-variance portfolio
selection problem formulation in a convex cone constrained market, have given the condition
under which there exists an admissible policy, have derived analytically the pre-committed
efficient mean-variance policy, and have identified the explicit conditions under which the pre-
committed efficient mean-variance policy is TCIE. The derived optimal policy is of a two-piece
linear form, and this fact reveals that in a cone constrained market, mean-variance investors may
switch between one efficient risky portfolio K+t and one inefficient risky portfolio K
−
t depending
on the individual’s current wealth level. Another prominent feature may also require our special
attention: Market constraints make the current risky portfolios dependent not only on the
current wealth level, but also on the future market conditions, even when the rates of return
among different time periods are assumed to be independent.
Furthermore, we have extended the definition of variance-optimal signed martingale measure
(VSMM) in unconstrained markets to minimum-variance signed supermartingale measure (VSSM)
in constrained markets, and have derived the semi-analytical expression of VSSM’s density (re-
spect to the original probability measure), which only depends on the basic market setting
(including the distribution of the excess rate of return, Pt, and the set of portfolio constraints,
At). Our major finding demonstrates that the property of TCIE and VSSM are closely related,
i.e., the pre-committed discrete-time efficient mean-variance policy (except for the minimum
variance policy) satisfies TCIE if and only if the conditional expectation of VSSM’s density is
nonnegative, or once the conditional expectation becomes negative, it remains the same neg-
ative value until the terminal time. This interesting finding is the first analytical result that
explicitly assesses the impact of constraints on the property of time consistency in dynamic
decision problems and motivates us to establish a general solution framework in constructing
TCIE dynamic portfolio selection models by introducing suitable portfolio constraints. The
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Figure 3: Comparison of efficient frontiers between Case 3 and the time consistent policy of
Example 5.1
semi-analytical expression of VSSM’s density may also benefit the research of mean-variance
hedging in constrained markets.
An extension of our result to continuous-time cone constrained markets is straightforward, at
least conceptually. On the other hand, if the rates of return among different periods are corre-
lated, the problem will become more complicated and the idea of opportunity-neutral measure
change in treating stochastic opportunity set in Cˇerny´ and Kallsen (2009) may be helpful. The
real challenge appears when considering general markets with convex portfolio constraints (may
not be a cone type). In such a market, the pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy may
depend on more than two risky portfolios, making the analysis much more complicated.
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APPENDIX:
A1: The proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof: From the definition in (3), it is easy to see that C±t > 0 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
The first-order and second-order derivatives of h±t (Kt) with respect toKt are given, respectively,
as follows,
▽Kth
±
t (Kt) = 2E
[
C+t+1
(
PtP
′
tKt ∓Pt
)
1{P′tKt≤±1} + C
−
t+1
(
PtP
′
tKt ∓Pt
)
1{P′tKt>±1}
]
,
▽2Kth
±
t (Kt) = 2E
[
C+t+1PtP
′
t1{P′tKt≤±1} + C
−
t+1PtP
′
t1{P′tKt>±1}
]
 2min(C+t+1, C
−
t+1)E
[
PtP
′
t
]
≻ 0.
Therefore, h±t (Kt) are strictly convex with respect to Kt, which implies that K
±
t are uniquely
determined. Furthermore, K±t are optimal if and only if(
▽Kth
±
t (K
±
t )
)′
(Kt −K
±
t ) ≥ 0, ∀ Kt ∈ At,(24)
(see Theorem 27.4 in Rockafellar (1970)), which implies(
▽Kth
±
t (K
±
t )
)′
(αK±t −K
±
t ) ≥ 0, ∀ α > 0,(
▽Kth
±
t (K
±
t )
)′
K±t = 0,(25)
due to the assumption that At is a cone.
Then, we have
E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)2
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)2
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
=E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
+
1
2
(
▽Kth
±
t (K
±
t )
)′
K±t
=E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
and
E
[
C+t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)2
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1∓P′tK
±
t
)2
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
=E
[
C+t+1
(
1− (K±t )
′PtP
′
tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1− (K±t )
′PtP
′
tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
+
(
▽Kth
±
t (K
±
t )
)′
K±t
=E
[
C+t+1
(
1− (K±t )
′PtP
′
tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t ≤±1}
+ C−t+1
(
1− (K±t )
′PtP
′
tK
±
t
)
1{P′tK
±
t >±1}
]
.
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Therefore,
C+t =E
[
C+t+1
(
1− (K+t )
′PtP
′
tK
+
t
)
1{P′tK
+
t ≤1}
+C−t+1
(
1− (K+t )
′PtP
′
tK
+
t
)
1{P′tK
+
t >1}
]
≤E
[
C+t+1
(
1− (K+t )
′PtP
′
tK
+
t
)
1{P′tK
+
t ≤1}
]
≤C+t+1.
The equality holds in the above inequality if and only if K+t = 0. The situation for C
−
t can be
proved similarly. 
A2: The proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof: Consider an auxiliary problem of (P (d)) by introducing Lagrangian multiplier 2µ,
(26)
min E
[
(xT − d)
2 + 2µ(xT − d)
]
,
s.t. xt+1 = stxt +P
′
tut,
ut ∈ At, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
which is equivalent to the following formulation,
min E
[
1
2
(
xT − (d− µ)
)2]
,
s.t. xt+1 = stxt +P
′
tut,
ut ∈ At, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1.
The above auxiliary problem can be further rewritten as
(L(µ)) : min E
[
1
2
y2T
]
,
s.t. yt+1 = styt +P
′
tut,
ut ∈ At, t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1,
where
yt , xt − (d− µ)ρ
−1
t , t = 0, 1, · · · , T.
Now we will prove that the value function of (L(µ)) at time t is
Jt(yt) = min
ut∈At,··· ,uT−1∈AT−1
E
[
1
2
y2T |Ft
]
=
1
2
ρ2t
[
C+t y
2
t 1{yt≤0} + C
−
t y
2
t 1{yt>0}
]
,(27)
where C+t and C
−
t are given in Lemma 2.1.
At time T , we have
JT (yT ) =
1
2
y2T =
1
2
ρ2T
[
C+T y
2
T 1{yT≤0} + C
−
T y
2
T1{yT>0}
]
.
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Thus, statement (27) holds true for time T . Assume that statement (27) holds true for time
t + 1. We now prove that the statement also remains true for time t. Applying the recursive
relationship between Jt+1 and Jt yields
(28)
Jt(yt) = min
ut∈At
E[Jt+1(yt+1)|Ft]
= min
ut∈At
1
2
ρ2t+1E
[
C+t+1y
2
t+11{yt+1≤0} + C
−
t+1y
2
t+11{yt+1>0}|Ft
]
= min
ut∈At
1
2
ρ2t+1E
[
C+t+1(styt +P
′
tut)
21{P′tut≤−styt} + C
−
t+1(styt +P
′
tut)
21{P′tut>−styt}|Ft
]
.
While yt < 0, identifying optimal ut within the convex cone ut ∈ At is equivalent to identifying
optimal Kt within the convex cone Kt ∈ At when we set ut = −stKtyt. We thus have
Jt(yt) = min
Kt∈At
1
2
ρ2t y
2
tE
[
C+t+1
(
1−P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt≤1} + C
−
t+1
(
1−P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt>1}
]
.
From Lemma 1, the optimal control takes the following form,
u⋆t = −stK
+
t yt.
Substituting u⋆t back to the value function (28) leads to
Jt(yt) =
1
2
ρ2t y
2
tE
[
C+t+1
(
1−P′tK
+
t
)2
1{P′tK
+
t ≤1}
+ C−t+1
(
1−P′tK
+
t
)2
1{P′tK
+
t >1}
]
=
1
2
C+t ρ
2
t y
2
t .
When yt > 0, identifying optimal ut within the convex cone ut ∈ At is equivalent to identifying
optimal Kt within the convex cone Kt ∈ At when we set ut = stKtyt. We thus have
Jt(yt) = min
Kt∈At
1
2
ρ2t y
2
tE
[
C+t+1
(
1 +P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt≤−1} + C
−
t+1
(
1 +P′tKt
)2
1{P′tKt>−1}
]
.
From Lemma 1, the optimal control takes the following form,
u⋆t = stK
−
t yt.
Substituting u⋆t back to the value function (28) leads to
Jt(yt) =
1
2
ρ2t y
2
tE
[
C+t+1
(
1 +P′tK
−
t
)2
1{P′tK
−
t ≤−1}
+ C−t+1
(
1 +P′tK
−
t
)2
1{P′tK
−
t >−1}
]
=
1
2
C−t ρ
2
t y
2
t .
When yt = 0, we can easily verify that u
⋆
t = 0 is the minimizer. We can thus set
Jt(yt) =
1
2
C+t ρ
2
t y
2
t .
In summary, the optimal value for problem (26) is
g(µ) = min
u0∈A0,··· ,uT−1∈AT−1
E
[
(xT − d)
2 + 2µ(xT − d)
]
=
{
C+0 (d− ρ0x0 − µ)
2 − µ2, if µ ≤ d− ρ0x0,
C−0 (d− ρ0x0 − µ)
2 − µ2, if µ > d− ρ0x0,
(29)
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which is a first-order continuously differentiable concave function. To obtain the optimal value
and optimal strategy for problem (P (d)), we maximize (29) over µ ∈ R according to Lagrangian
duality theorem. We derive our results for three different value ranges of d.
i) d = ρ0x0.
The optimal Lagrangian multiplier takes zero value, i.e., µ⋆ = 0. The optimal investment policy
is thus u⋆t = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
ii) d > ρ0x0.
When C+0 = 1, i.e., K
+
t = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, we can take µ
⋆ = −∞ resulting g(µ⋆) =
+∞. This means that P (d) does not have a feasible solution. When C+0 < 1 and C
−
0 = 1,
C+0 (d− ρ0x0−µ)
2−µ2 is a strictly concave function and C−0 (d− ρ0x0−µ)
2−µ2 is a decreasing
linear function. The optimal Lagrangian multiplier satisfies
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1− (C+0 )
−1
< (d− ρ0x0).
When C+0 < 1 and C
−
0 < 1, C
±
0 (d − ρ0x0 − µ)
2 − µ2 are both strictly concave. The optimal
Lagrangian multiplier satisfies
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1− (C+0 )
−1
< (d− ρ0x0).
Therefore, the optimal mean-variance pair is presented by
(
E[xT ], Var(xT )
)
= (d, g(µ⋆)) =
(
d,
C+0 (d− ρ0x0)
2
1− C+0
)
.
iii) d < ρ0x0.
Similarly, when C−0 = 1, P (d) does not have a feasible solution. When C
−
0 < 1, the optimal
Lagrangian multiplier satisfies
µ⋆ =
d− ρ0x0
1− (C−0 )
−1
> (d− ρ0x0).
Then, the optimal mean-variance pair is presented by
(
E[xT ], Var(xT )
)
= (d, g(µ⋆)) =
(
d,
C−0 (d− ρ0x0)
2
1− C−0
)
.
Therefore, g(µ) attains its maximum value at µ⋆ expressed in (6). Moreover, the optimal mean-
variance pair of problem (P (d)) is presented by
(
E[xT ], Var(xT )
)
=
(
d,
C+0 (d− ρ0x0)
2
1− C+0
1{d≥ρ0x0} +
C−0 (d− ρ0x0)
2
1− C−0
1{d<ρ0x0}
)
.
Finally, the efficient frontier follows naturally from our above discussion.

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A3: The proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof: Comparing Eq. (5) with Eq. (8), we can conclude that at time k, the truncated pre-
committed efficient mean-variance policy, u⋆t , t = k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1, also solves (P (dk) | xk)
when dk satisfies d−µ
⋆ = dk−µ
⋆
k. Note from the discussion after Theorem 2.1 that the solution
to (P (dk) | xk) is inefficient if and only if dk < ρkxk and C
−
k < 1 (or equivalently, the solution
to (P (dk) | xk) is efficient if i) dk ≥ ρkxk, or ii) dk < ρkxk and C
−
k = 1). When 0 < C
+
k < 1, we
have
dk ≥ ρkxk
⇔ (dk − ρkxk)
1
1− C+k
≥ 0
⇔ dk −
dk − ρkxk
1− (C+k )
−1
≥ ρkxk
⇔ dk − µ
⋆
k ≥ ρkxk, if dk ≥ ρkxk
⇔ dk − µ
⋆
k ≥ ρkxk,
⇔ d− µ⋆ ≥ ρkxk.
Therefore, when both d − µ⋆ ≥ ρkxk and C
+
k < 1 hold, the truncated pre-committed efficient
mean-variance policy remains efficient for the truncated problem (P (dk) | xk).
Similarly, when 0 < C−k < 1, we have
dk < ρkxk
⇔ (dk − ρkxk)
1
1− C−k
< 0
⇔ dk −
dk − ρkxk
1− (C−k )
−1
< ρkxk
⇔ dk − µ
⋆
k < ρkxk, if dk < ρkxk
⇔ dk − µ
⋆
k < ρkxk,
⇔ d− µ⋆ < ρkxk,
which implies that when both d − µ⋆ < ρkxk and C
−
k < 1 hold, the truncated pre-committed
efficient mean-variance policy switches to be inefficient for the truncated problem (P (dk) | xk).
When d − µ⋆ ≥ ρkxk, C
+
k = 1 or d − µ
⋆ < ρkxk, C
−
k = 1 hold, we have u
⋆
t = 0, t =
k, k + 1, . . . , T − 1, i.e., the truncated pre-committed efficient mean-variance policy becomes
the minimum variance policy for the truncated problem (P (dk) | xk).
The proposition follows when combining the results for all the situations discussed above. 
A4: The proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof: We only need to prove the first, the third and the fifth equalities.
Condition(d−µ⋆) > ρtxt dictates the optimal policy at time t as u
⋆
t = stK
+
t
(
(dk−µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t −xt
)
.
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The wealth level at time t+ 1 follows
xt+1 = stxt + stP
′
tK
+
t
(
(dk − µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t − xt
)
,
which implies
(d− µ⋆) ≥ ρt+1xt+1
⇔ (d− µ⋆) ≥ ρtxt + ρtP
′
tK
+
t
(
(dk − µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t − xt
)
⇔ [(d− µ⋆)− ρtxt] (1−P
′
tK
+
t ) ≥ 0
⇔ P′tK
+
t ≤ 1.
Thus the first statement holds.
Condition (d−µ⋆) < ρtxt dictates the optimal policy at time t as u
⋆
t = −stK
−
t
(
(dk−µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t −xt
)
.
The wealth level at time t+ 1 is
xt+1 = stxt − stP
′
tK
−
t
(
(dk − µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t − xt
)
,
which implies
(d− µ⋆) ≥ ρt+1xt+1
⇔ (d− µ⋆) ≥ ρtxt − ρtP
′
tK
−
t
(
(dk − µ
⋆
k)ρ
−1
t − xt
)
⇔ [(d− µ⋆)− ρtxt] (1 +P
′
tK
−
t ) ≥ 0
⇔ P′tK
−
t ≤ −1.
Thus the third statement holds.
Condition (d− µ⋆) = ρtxt dictates the optimal policy at time t as u
⋆
t = 0. The wealth level at
time t+ 1 is
xt+1 = stxt,
which implies
(d− µ⋆) = ρt+1xt+1 = ρtxt.
Thus the fifth statement holds. 
A5: The proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof: We solve both problems by duality theory. The dual problem of (A+(t)) is
max
νt∈R
max
−λt∈At
E
[
min
mt+1
Lt(mt+1, νt, λt)
∣∣∣Ft
]
,
where the Lagrangian function is defined as
Lt(mt+1, νt, λt) ,
(
1
C+t+1
1{mt+1≥0} +
1
C−t+1
1{mt+1<0}
)
m2t+1 − νtmt+1 + νt − λ
′
tPtmt+1.
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We also define
D(νt, λt) , E
[
min
mt+1
Lt(mt+1, νt, λt)
∣∣∣Ft
]
.
The first order condition of Lt(mt+1, νt, λt) with respect to mt+1 gives rise to
mt+1 =
C+t+1
2
(νt + λ
′
tPt)1{νt+λ′tPt≥0} +
C−t+1
2
(νt + λ
′
tPt)1{νt+λ′tPt<0}.(30)
Note that mt+1 ≥ 0 if and only if νt + λ
′
tPt ≥ 0.
Then we have
D(νt, λt) = E
[
−
1
4
(νt + λ
′
tPt)
2
(
C+t+11{νt+λ′tPt≥0} + C
−
t+11{νt+λ′tPt<0}
)
+ νt
]
.
If νt > 0, identifying optimal λt within the convex cone −λt ∈ At is equivalent to identifying
optimal Kt within the convex cone Kt ∈ At when we set λt = −νtKt. Then,
max
νt>0
max
−λt∈At
D(λt, νt)
=max
νt>0
max
Kt∈At
E
[
−
1
4
ν2t (1−K
′
tPt)
2
(
C+t+11{K′tPt≤1} + C
−
t+11{K′tPt>1}
)
+ νt
]
=max
νt>0
{
−
1
4
ν2t
{
min
Kt∈At
E
[
(1−K′tPt)
2
(
C+t+11{K′tPt≤1} + C
−
t+11{K′tPt>1}
)]}
+ νt
}
.
Therefore, D(λt, νt) attains its maximum
1
C+t
at
λ+t = −νtK
+
t ,(31)
ν+t =
2
C+t
.(32)
If νt < 0, identifying optimal λt within the convex cone −λt ∈ At is equivalent to identifying
optimal Kt within the convex cone Kt ∈ At when we set λt = νtKt. Then,
max
νt<0
max
−λt∈At
D(λt, νt)
=max
νt<0
max
Kt∈At
E
[
−
1
4
ν2t (1−K
′
tPt)
2
(
C+t+11{K′tPt≤−1} + C
−
t+11{K′tPt>−1}
)
+ νt
]
=max
νt<0
{
−
1
4
ν2t
{
min
Kt∈At
E
[
(1−K′tPt)
2
(
C+t+11{K′tPt≤−1} + C
−
t+11{K′tPt>−1}
)]}
+ νt
}
.
Now, D(λt, νt) attains its maximum 0 when νt ↑ 0.
Substituting both (31) and (32) into (30) yields the expression of m+t+1,
m+t+1 =
1
C+t
[
C+t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{P′tK
+
t ≤1}
+ C−t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{P′tK
+
t >1}
]
,
=
1
C+t
[
C+t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{m+t+1≥0}
+ C−t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{m+t+1<0}
]
,
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and the optimal objective value of (A+(t)),
E
[(
1
C+t+1
1{m+t+1≥0}
+
1
C−t+1
1{m+t+1<0}
)
(m+t+1)
2
∣∣∣Ft
]
=
1
(C+t )
2
E
[
C+t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )
21{P′tK
+
t ≤1}
+ C−t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )
21{P′tK
+
t >1}
]
=
1
C+t
.
Notice that m+t+1 ≥ 0 if and only if P
′
tK
+
t ≤ 1.
Applying a similar approach to problem (A−(t)) gives rise to the expression of m−t+1 and the
corresponding optimal optimal value 1
C−t
. Notice that m−t+1 ≤ 0 if and only if P
′
tK
−
t ≤ −1. 
A6: The proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof: The problem of finding the density of the minimum variance signed supermartingale
measure is formulated as
(33)
(PV SSM) : min E
[
m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
T
]
s.t. E
[
mt+1
∣∣Ft] = 1,
E
[
m1m2 · · ·mTPt
∣∣Ft] ∈ A⊥t ,
mt+1 ∈ L
2(Ft+1, P ),
t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1.
We will prove by induction that the cost-to-go function of (PV SSM) at time t is given by
J(m1m2 . . . mt) =
1
C+t
m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
t1{m1m2···mt≥0} +
1
C−t
m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
t1{m1m2···mt<0},
which implies (14).
At time T , the statement holds true by recognizing C±T = 1. Assume that the statement holds
true for time t+ 1. We now prove that the statement also remains true for time t.
At time t, when m1m2 · · ·mt > 0, (PV SSM) reduces to
min m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
tE
[(
1
C+t+1
1{mt+1≥0} +
1
C−t+1
1{mt+1<0}
)
m2t+1
∣∣∣Ft
]
s.t. E[mt+1|Ft] = 1,
E
[
mt+1Pt
∣∣Ft] ∈ A⊥t ,
mt+1 ∈ L
2(Ft+1, P ).
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On the other hand, when m1m2 · · ·mt < 0, (PV SSM) reduces to
min m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
tE
[(
1
C+t+1
1{mt+1≤0} +
1
C−t+1
1{mt+1>0}
)
m2t+1
∣∣∣Ft
]
s.t. E[mt+1|Ft] = 1,
−E
[
mt+1Pt
∣∣Ft] ∈ A⊥t ,
mt+1 ∈ L
2(Ft+1, P ).
With the help of Lemma 4.1, the optimal solution is
m∗t+1 = m
+
t+11{m1m2···mt≥0} +m
−
t+11{m1m2···mt<0}.
(When m1m2 · · ·mt = 0, we can set m
∗
t+1 = m
+
t+1.)
Then, the cost-to-go function becomes
J(m1m2 . . . mt) =
1
C+t
m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
t1{m1m2···mt≥0} +
1
C−t
m21m
2
2 · · ·m
2
t1{m1m2···mt<0}.
Now the remaining part in our proof is to prove that
m∗1m
∗
2 · · ·m
∗
T = (C
+
0 )
−1
T−1∏
i=0
Bi.
We will prove that
m∗1m
∗
2 · · ·m
∗
t = (C
+
0 )
−1
t−1∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+t 1{m∗1m∗2···m∗t≥0} + C
−
t 1{m∗1m∗2···m∗t<0}
)
,
which implies the conditional expectation in (13).
When t = 1, the following is obvious,
m∗1 = m
+
1 = (C
+
0 )
−1C+1 (1−P
′
0K
+
0 ) = (C
+
0 )
−1
0∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+1
)
.
Assume that at time t our statement holds true, we prove now that the statement also holds for
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time t+ 1, as
m∗1m
∗
2 · · ·m
∗
t+1
=(C+0 )
−1
t−1∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+t 1{m∗1 ···m∗t≥0} +C
−
t 1{m∗1 ···m∗t<0}
)(
m+t+11{m∗1 ···m∗t≥0} +m
−
t+11{m∗1 ···m∗t<0}
)
=(C+0 )
−1
t−1∏
i=0
Bi
[
C+t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{m∗1 ···m∗t≥0}1{m+t+1≥0}
+ C−t+1(1−P
′
tK
+
t )1{m∗1 ···m∗t≥0}1{m+t+1<0}
+ C+t+1(1 +P
′
tK
−
t )1{m∗1 ···m∗t<0}1{m−t+1≤0}
+ C−t+1(1 +P
′
tK
−
t )1{m∗1 ···m∗t<0}1{m−t+1>0}
]
=(C+0 )
−1
t−1∏
i=0
Bi
[
(1 −P′tK
+
t )1{m∗1 ···m∗t≥0} + (1 +P
′
tK
−
t )1{m∗1 ···m∗t<0}
]
·
(
C+t+11{m∗1 ···m∗t+1≥0} + C
−
t+11{m∗1 ···m∗t+1<0}
)
=(C+0 )
−1
t∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+t+11{m∗1 ···m∗t+1≥0} + C
−
t+11{m∗1 ···m∗t+1<0}
)
.
Therefore
m∗1m
∗
2 · · ·m
∗
T = (C
+
0 )
−1
T−1∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+T 1{m∗1m∗2 ···m∗T≥0} + C
−
T 1{m∗1m∗2···m∗T<0}
)
= (C+0 )
−1
T−1∏
i=0
Bi.

A7: The proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof: Lemma 3.1 already states the necessary and sufficient condition under which the pre-
committed efficient policy (except for the minimum variance policy) satisfies TCIE, which can
be summarized as follows:
For t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1,
∀ x⋆t , d− µ
⋆ ≥ ρtx
⋆
t ;
or ∃ x⋆t , d− µ
⋆ < ρtx
⋆
t , C
−
t = 1;
with d− µ⋆ > ρ0x0.
If at time t, ∃ x⋆t , d− µ
⋆ < ρtx
⋆
t , C
−
t = 1, then
x⋆t+1 = stx
⋆
t , d− µ
⋆ < ρtx
⋆
t = ρt+1x
⋆
t+1, C
−
t+1 = 1,
if and only if K−i = 0, (u
⋆
i = 0), i = t, t+ 1, · · · , T − 1.
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition can be reexpressed as
∀ T > t > 0, ∀ x⋆t , d− µ
⋆ ≥ ρtx
⋆
t ;
or C−τ = 1, where τ = inf
{
t
∣∣ d− µ⋆ < ρtx⋆t , t = 1, 2, · · · , T}
with d− µ⋆ > ρ0x0.
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Based on the expression of x⋆t in (17), we have
d− µ⋆ ≥ (<) ρtx
⋆
t ⇔ [(d− µ
⋆)− x0ρ0]
t−1∏
i=0
Bi ≥ (<) 0 ⇔
t−1∏
i=0
Bi ≥ (<) 0.
Furthermore, for T ≥ k ≥ τ and T > j ≥ τ ,
C−τ = 1,
τ−1∏
i=0
Bi < 0,
⇔ K−j = 0, C
−
k = 1,
τ−1∏
i=0
Bi < 0,
⇔
k−1∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+k 1{
∏k−1
i=0 Bi≥0}
+ C−k 1{
∏k−1
i=0 Bi<0}
)
=
τ−1∏
i=0
Bi
(
C+τ 1{
∏τ−1
i=0 Bi≥0}
+ C−τ 1{
∏τ−1
i=0 Bi<0}
)
< 0.
Noticing the expression of E
[
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣Ft] in (13) finally concludes our proof. 
A8: The proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof: Under the condition in the proposition, we have(
▽Kth
−
t (0)
)′
(Kt − 0) = 2C
−
t+1E[P
′
t]Kt ≥ 0, ∀ Kt ∈ At,
which implies K−t = 0 and C
−
t = 1 for all t. 
A9: The time consistent policy of (P (d))
In the solution framework proposed by Basak and Chabakauri (2010) and Bjo¨rk et al. (2014),
the so-called time consistent policy at time t is derived by a backward induction, taking into
account that optimal investment decisions have already been taken in the future. Thus, the
time consistent policy is the collection of equilibrium strategies adopted by fictitious investors
at different times in a sequential game. More specifically, the time t investor considers the
following problem,
(34) (Pt(d)) :


min
ut∈Rn
Var(xT |xt) ≡ E
[
(xT − d)
2|xt
]
,
s.t. E[xT |xt] = d,
xt+1 = stxt +P
′
tut,
xj+1 = sjxj +P
′
ju¯j , j = t+ 1, · · · , T − 1,
u¯j solves Problem (Pj(d)), j = t+ 1, · · · , T − 1.
We will prove by induction that the time consistent policy, the conditional mean and conditional
variance of terminal wealth under time consistent policy are given as
u¯t = −E
−1[PtP
′
t]E[Pt]
xtρt − d
Btρt+1
,(35)
E[xT |xt]{u¯} = d,(36)
Var(xT |xt){u¯} = (d− xtρt)
2Dt,(37)
36
where Bt = E[P
′
t]E
−1[PtP
′
t]E[Pt] and
Dt =
T−1∏
j=t
1−Bj
Bj
> 0.
We start our proof from time T −1 where the investor faces the following optimization problem,
(PT−1(d)) :
{
min
uT−1∈Rn
E
[
(sT−1xT−1 +P
′
T−1uT−1 − d)
2|xT−1
]
,
s.t. E[sT−1xT−1 +P
′
T−1uT−1|xT−1] = d,
which can be solved by the Lagrangian method with its solution given as
u¯T−1 = −E
−1[PT−1P
′
T−1]E[PT−1]
xT−1ρT−1 − d
BT−1
,
E[xT |xT−1]{u¯} = d,
Var(xT |xT−1){u¯} = (d− xT−1ρT−1)
2DT−1.
Assume that at time t + 1, (35), (36) and (37) hold. Then at time t, the investor faces the
following optimization problem,
(Pt(d)) :


min
ut∈Rn
Var(xT |xt) ≡ E[Var(xT |xt+1){u¯}|xt
]
+Var
(
E[xT |xt+1]{u¯}|xt
)
,
s.t. E[E[xT |xt+1]{u¯}|xt] = d,
xt+1 = stxt +P
′
tut,
which is equivalent to
min
ut∈Rn
Dt+1E[(d− (stxt +P
′
tut)ρt+1)
2|xt
]
.
It is not difficult to verify the following optimal solutions for (Pt(d)),
u¯t = −E
−1[PtP
′
t]E[Pt]
xtρt − d
Btρt+1
,
E[xT |xt]{u¯} = d,
Var(xT |xt){u¯} = (d− xtρt)
2Dt.
Therefore, the efficient frontier of the time consistent policy is given as
Var(xT ){u¯} = (E[xT ]{u¯} − x0ρ0)
2D0, E[xT ]{u¯} ≥ x0ρ0.(38)
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